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ABSTRACT 
Lu, Zebin. M.S., Purdue University, August 2012. Secure Web Applications against Off-
Line Password Guessing Attack: A Two Way Password Protocol with Challenge 
Response Using Arbitrary Images. Major Professor: Dr. Xukai Zou. 
 
 
The web applications are now being used in many security oriented areas, including on-
line shopping, e-commerce, which require the users to transmit sensitive information on 
the Internet. Therefore, to successfully authenticate each party of web applications is very 
important. A popular deployed technique for web authentication is the Hypertext Transfer 
Protocol Secure (HTTPS) protocol. However the protocol does not protect the careless 
users who connect to fraudulent websites from being trapped into tricks. For example, in 
a phishing attack, a web user who connects to an attacker may provide password to the 
attacker, who can use it afterwards to log in the target website and get the victim’s 
credentials. To prevent phishing attacks, the Two-Way Password Protocol (TPP) and 
Dynamic Two-Way Password Protocol (DTPP) are developed. However there still exist 
potential security threats in those protocols. For example, an attacker who makes a fake 
website may obtain the hash of users’ passwords, and use that information to arrange off-
line password guessing attacks. Based on TPP, we incorporated challenge responses with 
arbitrary images to prevent the off-line password guessing attacks in our new protocol, 
TPP with Challenge response using Arbitrary image (TPPCA). Besides TPPCA, we 
developed another scheme called Rain to solve the same problem by dividing shared 
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secrets into several rounds of negotiations. We discussed various aspects of our protocols, 
the implementation and experimental results. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 What is the World Wide Web 
The World Wide Web [20], which is also known as WWW, W3 or the Web is a 
conceptual system which comprises of various types of interlinked documents (basically 
HTML, but also contains many others) available on the Internet. With the functionalities 
provided by a typical web browser, people can view web pages that contain a variety of 
contents, such as text, images, videos, which may be modified by active contents (both 
run on the server side and on the client side) or displayed in various styles using 
Cascading Style Sheet. Moreover, people can also navigate between related web pages 
via the hyperlinks to them. 
Although the functionalities the World Wide Web provided today is much more than 
those in its first stage, the underlying protocol it uses to communicate the web servers and 
the clients is still the same, HTTP, which is further based on the network protocol suite, 
Transmission Control Protocol (TCP)/ Internet Protocol (IP). 
Once a user asks for the resources located on a specific web server, (either by typing 
the URL of the web page in a web browser or by clicking a hyperlink to that page or 
resource, the web browser begins sending a HTTP request to the server with the 
Universal Resource Locator (URL) of the resource. After performing proper 
authentication scheme if there is any, the server then sends back to the client the
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requested resource using TCP segments. Whether each TCP segment contains one or 
more request and response depends on the version of HTTP which is used [6 pp. 239-
247]. As mentioned above, images, videos, other multimedia, active contents, or style 
sheet data may also be provided by the web server. Therefore, additional HTTP requests 
have to be made to retrieve the data. After receiving them, the web browser renders the 
page on the screen as specified by its HTML content using the additional data. 
 
1.2 Popularity and Security Issues of the World Wide Web 
Surfing on the Internet has already been a part in most people’s lives because of its 
popularity and convenience. As of March 2009, the indexable web contains at least 25.21 
billion pages [20]. On July 25, 2008, Google software engineers Jesse Alpert and Nissan 
Hajaj announced the Google Search had discovered one trillion unique URLs [19]. As of 
March 2012, there are over 139.0 million domains operated according to the 
DomainTools’ announcement [14]. 
On the other hand, the popularity of WWW imposes a large number of underlying 
risks targeting not only the users but also the servers of a variety of web applications. 
Types of attacks include eavesdropping, spoofing, phishing attacks [10 pp. 54-55], and 
many others. The web applications are now used in many information sensitive areas, 
including on-line shopping, e-commerce, which require their users to transmit credentials 
on the Internet to make business activities. The result would be severe if the users 
couldn’t protect their secrets from the adversaries on the insecure network. Therefore, to 
correctly authenticate a server and a user of a web application in both directions is in the 
predominant importance. Since the invention of the web technology including the 
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application layer protocol HTTP 1.0 [3], many schemes of authentication for web 
applications have been developed and deployed, including Basic Access Authentication, 
Digest Access Authentication [9], HTTPS [17] and some others. 
A normal procedure deployed for authenticating a web session is to use password 
digest after executing the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) protocol or the Transport Layer 
Security (TLS) protocol [19]. When a user asks for some resource located in a web server, 
the user is given back a certificate which can be used to verify the identity of the server. 
After executing SSL/TLS successfully both the parties share a symmetric encryption key 
which is used to encrypt the following data transferred in between. The user then 
provides a password to the server for identification check. The server checks the 
password with a pre-stored value. After that, the server may store a user authenticator 
(UAC) in the client machine to keep the user authenticated. 
Using the above scheme prevents some types of network attacks, such as 
eavesdropping and spoofing. However, malicious people may bypass the scheme from 
the crack of the two parts of the protocol. For example, the malicious may produce a 
similar web page to the original website to trick the user to believe that the fraudulent 
page is the intended one. If the user fails to recognize the abnormal status, the user may 
provide password or other credentials to the attacker, who may use and modify that 
information afterwards. This problem is called a phishing attack. (There are also ways to 
trap users such as by sending fake emails.) 
To prevent phishing attacks, researchers have been working on new schemes for many 
years. One of the solutions is TPP/DTPP [5], which forms the bases of our scheme, 
TPPCA. However there still exist potential security threats in those protocols. For 
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example, an attacker who makes a fake website may obtain the hash of users’ passwords, 
and use that information to arrange off-line password guessing attacks [12 pp. 217, 241-
243]. Based on TPP, we incorporated challenge responses with arbitrary images to 
prevent the off-line password guessing attacks in our new protocol, TPP with Challenge 
response using Arbitrary image (TPPCA). 
Another scheme, Rain, uses shared secrets to generate challenges which accept 
inaccurate answers, in this way, to keep the hash of users’ passwords secure from 
phishing attacks. 
 
1.3 Organization of the Thesis 
The rest part is arranged as the following: We introduce World Wide Web and its 
techniques in chapter 2. In chapter 3, we summarize various security issues regarding to 
web authentication, and illustrate the weakness and advantages of various existing 
schemes which are used to prevent different types of attacks on web applications. In 
chapter 4, we focus on the design and theory of one of the latest protocols, TPP. In 
chapter 5, we show the limitation of combining TPP with challenge responses. In chapter 
6, we show how TPPCA prevents the off-line password guessing attack in addition to 
various other types. In chapter 7, we illustrate another possible solution, Rain scheme. In 
chapter 8, we summarize our implementation of TPPCA. We discuss the future work in 
chapter 9 and make a conclusion in chapter 10. Finally, in the Appendix we reexamine 
the TLS, the base protocol of TPP. 
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CHAPTER 2.  WEB ATTACKS AND SECURITY MEASURES 
2.1 Concepts of Authentication 
According to Cole, E., etc. [6 p. 84], “authentication is verification that the user’s claimed 
identity is valid, and it is usually implemented through a user password at logon time.” 
Authentication is based on a variety of methods from users’ secret passwords to people’s 
biometric characteristics. Generally, any authentication falls into one of the following 
three categories: 
The so-called Type 1 authentications are those that use people’s knowledge of a 
personal secret, such as a personal identification number (PID) or a password. 
The second type is based on what a user has, such as a smart card, an Automated Teller 
Machine (ATM) card or any other equipment. 
The last type of authentications uses the characteristics of a user, which may include a 
fingerprint, face figure, or retina scan. 
After authentication, a user is allowed to access certain computer resources and 
information or perform any authorized modification on those resources. Particularly, in a 
website scenario, users may request the resources which are located on a web server in 
the form of HyperText Markup Language (HTML) or any other compliant data format 
using HTTP protocol.
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2.2 Web Authentication 
Now we examine the concept of an authenticated session of web applications. As the 
underlying TCP protocol lacks a way to implement the authentication mechanism, HTTP 
itself must provide a method to authenticate users. Furthermore, HTTP or the layer above 
must maintain the continuity of an authenticated session up to the top business layer, 
which provides last-long authentication features among numbers of data transactions. As 
demonstrated by Gollmann, D. [10 pp. 342, 343], authenticated sessions are established 
on the following three layers: 
Authenticated sessions exist at three conceptual layers: 
The uppermost layer is business application layer, which builds up the authentication 
mechanism between a web application user and the corresponding service provider. 
The network application layer, which lies in the middle, is the authentication layer 
which connects a web browser to a web server. 
The bottom layer, the transport layer, provides authentication features between a TCP 
client and a TCP server. 
Particularly, an authenticated session at the transport layer can be established with 
SSL/TLS on the top of TCP/IP. For the users who have a public key-private key pair and 
a corresponding certificate, TLS with mutual authentication can be established. However, 
in the real world, requiring every user possess such an identifier is never possible. 
Therefore web services usually use SSL/TLS with password scheme to achieve mutual 
authentication. An Extensible Authentication Protocol Tunneled Transport Layer Security 
(EAP-TTLS) model is such an example. Based on the model, the currently deployed 
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solution for website authentications is HTTPS protocol, which runs HTTP over TLS. The 
detail of HTTPS is specified in RFC 2818 [17]. 
For maintaining the validity of an authentication session, at the network application 
layer the server may create a session identifier (SID) and transmit it to its client. The 
client passes the SID in subsequent requests to the server. Requests contain the same SID 
are automatically checked and bound to the same transaction fluid which maintains the 
same authentication status. 
Cookie is an often used in web authentication sessions to store session information in 
clients. A cookie is sent by a web server in a HTTP response. After that, the 
corresponding browser stores the cookie in a specific file and includes it in the requests 
of the same domain. 
 
2.3 HTTPS and EAP-TTLS 
According to RFC 2818, TLS is used as a wrapper of HTTP data, which is similar to use 
HTTP on the top of TCP. 
To illustrate, when a web browser sends a HTTP request to a web server, if there’s no 
pre-exist HTTPS session, it has to perform a TLS handshake, which is to perform the 
mutual directional authentication. 
After the success of the authentication, all HTTP data is wrapped as TLS application 
data to provide most important security features, such as data integrity and data secrecy. 
HTTPS is an example of how EAP-TTLS is implemented. 
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According to Gollmann, D. [10 pp. 314-316], “the Extensible Authentication Protocol 
(EAP) defines authentication protocols at the level of abstract message flows called 
methods.” The methods can be built upon any possible underlying schemes.  
EAP-TTLS is intended to authenticate both parties of a connection when a user 
connects to a server from a client machine. For example, in the scenario of a web service, 
a user uses a web browser to connect and request resources from a web server. The server 
has a certificate, which can be used by the web browser to verify the identity of the server 
with a public key it provides. The client uses TLS to authenticate the server through a 
handshake phrase and then establish a secure tunnel to the server. The user is 
authenticated by the server using a password scheme. As a result, EAP-TTLS prevents 
eavesdropping and man-in-the-middle attacks in the case that the TLS tunnel has been 
established correctly with the intended server, such as an intended web server or website. 
 
2.4 Pitfall of EAP-TTLS 
According to Gollmann, D. [10 p. 344], in the EAP-TTLS scenario, including the use of 
HTTPS, the authentication session is safe as long as the web browser, under the user’s 
instruction, connects to the intended website. However, there exist some situations when 
a user tempts to make a connection to the intended server the attacker comes in the 
middle. For the web, this may be trigged by typing a domain name mistakenly or by 
clicking a fraudulent hyperlink in a phishing email. When a user is tricked into opening a 
TLS session with the third party, a man-in-the-middle attack becomes possible. 
After the user opens a secure TLS tunnel to the attacker, the attacker can then open 
another TLS tunnel to the targeted server if there is a popular website with a similar 
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domain name. The server will ask the attacker the user’s credentials, such as the user’s 
personal identification number (PID) or password. The attacker in turn asks the user for 
the credentials. The user, without detecting the abnormal status, may reply the attacker 
with the credentials. If the attacker provides the information to the server, the server will 
successfully authenticate the attacker as the user. The server may afterwards create a 
UAC, e.g. a cookie, and send it to the attacker. From then on the attacker will 
impersonate the user on that website using the stored UAC. The following figure 
illustrates such an attack. Other than the pitfall described above, there also exists another 
kind of man-in-the-middle type of attack which may happen during a TLS session 
renegotiation phrase [18]. 
 
Figure 2.1 A Man-in-the-Middle Attack Breaking Application-Layer Sessions [10 p. 344] 
 
2.5 SSL/TLS Session-aware 
One of the existing methods which secure EAP-TTLS from man-in-the-middle 
(MITM) attacks is the SSL/TLS session-aware user authentication scheme.  
As demonstrated by Oppliger, R., Hauser, R., & Basin, D. [15], “the main idea is to 
make the user authentication depend not only on the user’s credentials, but also on state 
information related to the SSL/TLS session in which the credentials are being transferred 
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to the server.” The theory behind this scheme is that the server need a way to check 
whether the SSL/TLS session in which the credentials is sent to the server is the same as 
the session in which the credentials is sent from the user. The equality of the two sessions 
determines the existence of a MITM attack: If the two sessions are the same, it is likely 
no MITM attack involved; if the two sessions are different, a MITM attack probably 
exists between the two parties. 
In the SSL/TLS session-aware user authentication scheme, the user provides a UAC 
which is created using both the user’s credentials and the SSL/TLS session state 
information. An attacker who is in the middle and holds the UAC cannot use only the 
credentials personate the user, because the UAC bounded to the earlier SSL/TLS session 
from the user to the attacker cannot be used in another session between the attacker and 
the targeted server. The server checks the UAC to detect anything abnormal.  
However, an apparent security threat underlies SSL/TLS session-aware user 
authentication is that although the attacker cannot impersonate the user, without mutual 
authentication, the attacker can still trick the user to believe that everything goes well and 
to ask the user to submit the credentials. For example, by impersonating a web server of 
on-line shopping, an attacker may request the victim to provide credit card information to 
execute on-line transactions, and therefore use the credit card information in other 
purchases. This put the user in an unsafe environment. 
 
2.6 Phishing Attacks and Anti-phishing Measures 
As the description from the Wikipedia [16], “phishing is a way of attempting to 
acquire information such as usernames, passwords, and credit card details by 
11 
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masquerading as a trustworthy entity in an electronic communication.” Websites pretend 
to be from popular social networks, large commercial companies, online payment 
processors are commonly used to trick the careless web users. Phishing attacks are 
typically carried out by sending spoofed e-mail which contains a hyperlink to navigate a 
fake website of which the appearance and user experience are almost the same to the 
legitimate one.  
Anti-Phishing Measures include blocked site lists, site information indicators, and 
some others: 
In the scenario of using blocked site lists, a single central database maintains a list of 
fraudulent websites. The web browsers check this database before proceeding to a site. 
This approach is able to prevent phishing attacks if the fraudulent websites are discovered 
in time and the list is updated quickly. However the weakness of the scheme is that it 
requires universal trust in a single authority. Compromising the single authority paralyzes 
the whole system, and a centralized blocking list also lacks the functionality to 
personalize fraudulent lists according to different web users’ decisions. 
Site information indicator is another scheme to prevent phishing attacks. Such an 
indicator provides information about a website in a web browser toolbar or status bar. For 
example, SpoofStick [8] displays the current website’s domain name in larger characters 
which can be examined more easily by web users. In another implementation, Firefox 
displays the domain name of the SSL certificate. Similarly, TrustBar [11] and a tool for 
Internet Explorer 7 [13] show the name of the SSL certificate authority in addition.  
Another scheme, TPP, is a password protocol used in the conjunction with TLS to 
enable web users correctly authenticate their intended web servers, and therefore protects 
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the users from potential phishing attacks. We now give a detailed discussion of TPP in the 
following chapter. 
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CHAPTER 3. TPP/DTPP 
In this chapter we will first discuss a major feature used by TPP/DTPP—universal 
password, following by the concrete design of TPP and the relevant problems. Because 
DTPP is with a little difference of TPP, we will briefly illustrate the uniqueness of DTPP 
in the end of this chapter. 
 
3.1 Universal Password 
One of the major advantages of TPP is using universal password, which is also called a 
master secret. With the help of the domain name, universal passwords generate unique 
website oriented passwords for each possible websites. This feature solves two problems 
together: 
Psychological studies have discovered that humans can repeat with perfect accuracy 
about only eight meaningful items, such as digits, letters, or words [7]. If a random 
password is eight characters long, humans can remember only one of such a password. 
Thus, people tend to choose pronounceable and short passwords for easy remember, 
however the passwords of this category are not strong enough for off-line password 
guessing attacks. Even worse, many people like to choose frequently used words with 
numbers (such as birthday of a family member) to create passwords, which are more 
vulnerable to a typical dictionary attack. Controversially, to prevent attackers from using 
14 
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one password of a user on one website to another, it is highly recommended to use 
different passwords for different websites. This produces more burdens on web users. 
Fortunately, TPP solves the problems by hashing the concatenation of a unique master 
secret and the domain name of the intended servers (the domain name can be recorded 
from the header of HTTP responses). As only a unique secret is required, people are able 
to pick up longer characters as their master secrets which are hard to be guessed by a 
computer. 
On the other hand, using universal password introduces new security threats. One of 
them is that because this is the origin of the passwords for all the websites a user uses, it 
is devastating if the master secret is captured by an attacker. Besides, the security of a 
universal password relies highly on the user working environment, such as the web 
browsers which take the full responsibility for the user to communicate with web servers. 
Therefore, a malware or malicious codes, such as Trojan horse, may corrupt the system 
and transmit the master secret to an attacker no matter how secure the protocols seem to 
be. The threat occurs more often as a person uses a computer in public place without 
proper supervision. As a result deploying universal password scheme may produce a one 
point fatal weakness in web authentications. 
Besides, the current use of universal password is aimed to each website separately, and 
no synchronization scheme is proposed. As a result, managing the master secret 
conveniently becomes a big issue. To clarify the idea, let’s consider the case in which a 
web user creates the password for each of the website being used. The user probably 
doesn’t set up all the accounts at the same time. From time to time, the user will be asked 
by different websites to change the corresponding password according to the password 
15 
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aging [4 pp. 184-186] feature deployed by many websites for provide additional 
protection on passwords. Without proper synchronization among the password aging, the 
user is forced, each time a password aging event occur, to log on each website he used, 
and enter the new master secret to change the specific password. The user needs to record 
all the websites he has a password and mark the ones of which the password has been 
updated. Furthermore, if each of the website has a different time plan to update the 
corresponding user’s password, the user may have to change the master secret very often, 
which not only requires the user’s wearisome work but also keep the user busy 
remembering which master secret is the latest. One possible solution is to create a 
website service which records all the websites used by a user and automatically make 
updates to the passwords of those websites when the user changes the master secret by 
password aging event. The helpful application may also provide a method to synchronize 
the time of password aging events for the websites to minimize the number of times of 
making updates. 
 
3.2 Design of TPP 
Now we demonstrate the implementation of TPP which use universal password.  
The password for any specific server/ website denoted as pu is computed as  
pu = H(upu,ds) 
where the upu is the universal password (master secret) of the user, ds is the domain 
name of the server, and H(upu, ds) is the result of using hash function H on the 
concatenation of the upu, and the ds. 
16 
 
 
1
6
 
At the registration phrase to the website S, the user U stores in the server the user 
name and the hash of the password for S, which are denoted as U, and H(pu) respectively. 
Each time the authentication is executed the following protocol is used: 
US  :   execute TLS and compute ms 
US  :   ms <enter user id> 
US  :   ms <U> 
US  :   ms < H(pu), enter password> 
US  :   ms <pu> 
where the ms is the key generated in executing TLS in the first step. The ms is used to 
encrypt the data in the following steps of the protocol. 
 
3.3 How does TPP Prevent Phishing Attacks 
As the sophisticated phishing attacks became the one of the predominant challenges in 
concurrent web experience, TPP arose to solve the problem. The authors of TPP illustrate 
how it secures web authentications against phishing attacks as the following: 
1. U  M  : execute TLS and compute ms 
2.  MS : execute TLS and compute ms’ 
3.  MS  : ms’ <enter user id> 
4. U  M  : ms <enter user id> 
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5. U  M  : ms <U> 
6. MS  : ms’ <U> 
7. MS  : ms’ < H2(upu,ds), enter password> 
8. U  M  : The attack fails at this point since M cannot compute 
ms<H
2
(upu,dm) > which need to be sent to U to accomplish the 
authentication  
where ds is the domain name of the server and dm is the domain name of the attacker. 
 
3.4 Can a DNS Break the System? 
In TPP, the domain names take an important role, which determine whether the protocol 
execute successfully. People may ask whether TPP defeats domain name fakes.  
There’re several ways attacking the Domain Name System (DNS), such as 
manipulating the header which contains the domain information, DNS poisoning and so 
on. An attacker can possibly deceive a user to believe that the data packages sent by the 
attacker come from the intended website. He can also eavesdrop the messages of a 
communication. So the problem is whether the attacker can make that trick in the last step 
of the above protocol. 
Fortunately, the fake of a website in the last step never happen because of using TLS, 
which uses a certificate to verify the identity of a party. It means that after executing TLS 
the attacker is bound to a specific domain name according to the certification, and the 
domain name is recorded to produce the user password on the client machine. Therefore 
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as long as the attacker doesn’t hold the certificate of the intended website, the attacker 
cannot impersonate the server. 
 
3.5 Vulnerability to a Dictionary Attack 
However, theoretically TPP is not secure for off-line password guessing attacks. 
To illustrate, suppose an attacker arranges a phishing attack in TPP, according to the 
protocol, the web server sends the attacker the hashed password for the website, denoted 
as H(pu). From then on, the attacker may start a dictionary attack to the user’s master 
secret with all other inputs available to produce H(pu). This means whether the password 
is safe against off-line password guessing attacks is not depended on the protocol but 
only the quality of the password. As a result, to secure the master secret against 
dictionary attacks, the user must choose the master secret carefully enough. However 
TPP itself doesn’t help its users to check the quality. People who use TPP thus have the 
complete responsibility to make the master secret safe. (Although some websites check 
the passwords entered by their users, the only thing they check is the quality of the hashes, 
which are produced from the master secret and therefore have a good quality. Thus, web 
server based password checking services don’t help the users to ensure the quality of their 
master secrets.
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CHAPTER 4. TPP WITH CHALLENGE RESPONSE 
In order to make dictionary attacks infeasible, we have tried to use challenge response [4 
pp. 186-190] instead of sending the hash of password in TPP. However, a typical 
challenge-respond scheme doesn’t provide much protection against dictionary attacks. To 
illustrate, we now examine what happens when TPP is executed with challenge response 
below: 
US:  execute TLS and compute ms 
US:   ms <enter user id> 
US:  ms <U> 
US:  ms<r> 
US:  ms< eH(pu) r > 
US:  ms< pu> 
In the above procedure, a user sends out a random number, denoted as r, which is used 
to generate a challenge. The server which stores the user’s password could compute the 
response correctly. The client on behalf of the user, if accepts the response, sends the 
user’s password back.
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The reason why the above scheme is unsafe against dictionary attacks is that although 
the attacker who cannot obtain H(pu) directly, can still guess the universal password and 
check the guessed values by appending the intended server’s domain name, hashing the 
result, encrypting the number r using it as the key, and compare with the captured value 
eH(pu) r. Therefore, adding challenge response to TPP cannot secure low quality master 
secret from off-line password guessing attacks but only add a little more computational 
work to the attacker’s computer. 
What a typical challenge response scheme cannot accomplish may be added 
successfully by users’ intervention.
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CHAPTER 5. TPP WITH CHALLENGE RESPONSE USING ARBITRARY IMAGES 
(TPPCA) 
The off-line password guessing attack target users’ master secrets in TPP generally test 
each possible combination of frequently used characters (which include letters, numbers, 
and punctuations), and select the one(s) which produces the response eH(pu) r from the 
challenge r. To test the intended server the knowledge of H(pu), the user must provide r 
and record eH(pu) r. In the other hand, these two values make it possible to perform an off-
line password guessing attack. Therefore using TPP with typical challenge responses, it is 
never achieved to both authenticate the server successfully and prevent off-line password 
guessing attacks thoroughly. 
We then tried to introduce the user’s intervention into the authentication process. 
Specifically, we let the server generate an arbitrary image randomly when it receives a 
challenge from a web user. The generated image should contain some features which can 
be recognized by the user. For example, we draw some characters which contain the user 
name and a welcome message, then distort it in some way (such as to flip some pixels of 
the image randomly). The image is then encrypted using the user’s password and sent 
back to the user. The client then decrypts the data using the password and shows the 
image to the user. The user examines whether the image fits the above criteria. If so, the 
user will tell the client to send out the password in order to complete the protocol. 
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5.1 Protocol of TPPCA 
The complete protocol is listed below: 
US:  execute TLS and compute ms 
US:  ms <enter user id> 
US:  ms <U> 
US:  ms< eH(pu) Image, enter password > 
US:  ms<pu> Let the user examine the image. Send back the 
password or terminate the protocol. 
 
5.2 Security Analysis 
In a scenario of man-in-the-middle attack, an attacker obtains the encryption of a 
randomly generated image. If the attacker uses the image to arrange an off-line password 
guessing attack, the attacker is able to decrypt the cipher using the guessed keys but not 
able to verify the result images using only computer, because the image is created 
arbitrarily and thus there’s no strict rules determining which one of the images generated 
by the attacker is “correct” or “wrong”. Therefore there’s no way to confirm the guesses 
of the master secret. 
In another case, because the attacker doesn’t know the master secret, forging such an 
image to conceive user is impossible. Besides, if the attacker simply transmits the cipher 
to the user, the client will use the attacker’s domain name (instead of that of the targeted 
website) to decrypt the message, and probably fail to get a recognizable and reasonable 
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image. The user then disconnects the authentication process to prevent the attacker from 
obtaining the password. The following procedure describes a MITM attack in executing 
TPPCA: 
1. U  M  : execute TLS and compute ms 
2.      M  S  : execute TLS and compute ms’ 
3.      M    S  : ms’ <enter user id> 
4. U      M  : ms <enter user id> 
5. U      M  : ms <U> 
6.     M    S  : ms’ <U> 
7.     M    S  : ms’ < e H2(upu,ds)Image, enter password> The attack 
fails at this point since M cannot deliver a meaningful image to the user  
where ds is the domain name of the server and dm is the domain name of the phishing 
website/attacker. 
Therefore TPPCA protects users’ master secrets against man-in-the-middle attacks and 
off-line dictionary attacks. 
 
5.3 Alternative Scheme 
A variation of TPPCA let the user types some letters first as a challenge in a form (for 
example, a welcome followed by the user’s name), sends them out to the server as the 
content of the image which the server needs to create. The server then creates such an 
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image using the letters, encrypts the result, and send back to the user. After decrypting 
the message, the user compares it with the original letters. The user authenticates the 
server if the image matches the letters, otherwise terminates the protocol. 
The procedure is demonstrated as the below: 
US:  execute TLS and compute ms 
US:  ms <enter user id> 
US:  ms <U> 
U->S:  ms<l> 
US:  ms< eH(pu) Image, enter password > 
US:  ms<pu> 
where l is the requirements for constructing a valid image. 
 
5.4 Comparison of the Two Schemes 
Comparing to the first scheme of TPPCA, the latter one provides an attacker more 
information to arrange an off-line dictionary attack as that not only the arbitrary image 
but also the corresponding letters are available to the attacker. This weakness gives the 
attacker some hints to test his guesses of master secret comparing to the first scheme. On 
the other hand, the second scheme of TPPCA reduces the chance of the attacker’s making 
a recognizable image by restricting the rules to be used. 
25 
 
 
2
5
 
We’ve already said that the weakness of the first scheme is that by a very small chance 
an attacker could forge such an image with distinguishable letters. To eliminate the 
problem, the administrator of the website may set some constraints on the letters 
delivered, such as how many letters must be included and only use the popular phrases of 
a specific language. The user then verifies the received images with the constraints and 
only accepts to the qualified ones.
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CHAPTER 6. RAIN SCHEME 
Now we give another solution which is called rain scheme. We first give a general idea 
about the design and then show the details 
 
6.1 General Idea 
In a hashed password (message digest) scheme, a hash function provides a desirable 
feature to prevent trace back to the key, however it’s not a good design against off-line 
password guessing attacks (which is also called dictionary attacks) as it provides an 
accurate match from a password to a hash. Suppose American Standard Code for 
Information Interchange (ASCII) or Unique, Universal, and Uniform Character Encoding 
(UNICODE) is used, there usually are only a few, if not unique, strings of human 
readable characters generate the same hash. Therefore once an attacker finds out such a 
matching string, he can be pretty sure the string of characters is the user’s master secret. 
In order to eliminate the problem, which is providing an accurate match of a password, 
we reduce the information included in each response to a challenge by giving the 
challenger “blurry” answers. Therefore, even if an attacker obtains an answer, without 
knowing enough information to test the guesses, a dictionary attack cannot succeed. 
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6.2 Design Detail 
Here comes the rain algorithm: Each time a challenger sends to the other side a point in a 
two dimension space, say Q, with the coordinates (xQ,yQ) to identify it, and also the time 
he received the last massage (denoted as trec) from the other. The later one first validate 
the time of receiving using the constraint demonstrated in the figure 6.1 below, if it’s  
 
Figure 6.1 Time Validation of Rain Scheme 
valid, then do the following match: The concatenation of the hashed password H(pu), xQ, 
and yQ is matched to an integer as the x coordinate of another point P, xp; the 
concatenation of H(pu) and trec is matched to another integer as the y coordinate of 
another point P, yp. (One way of the match is to divide a concatenation as a binary integer 
by another predefined large integer, and to enhance the security, matching the residue to 
the decimal part of π can also be used, see the figures below.)  
 
Figure 6.2 Compute X-coordinate of Point P in Rain Scheme 
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Figure 6.3 Compute Y-coordinate of Point P in Rain Scheme 
Now as the responder computes the position of point P as above, instead of sending it 
back to the challenger directly, the responder randomly selects another point say M, 
denoted by its coordinates (xM,yM), which is within the radius of R (a predefined distance 
in the protocol) from P. (See figure 6.4 below) The responder then sends M back as a 
inaccurate but acceptable answer. The challenger, at the same time, uses the necessary 
knowledge to compute P, and after receiving the response, checks the answer with the 
above constraints using points P, M and distance R. 
 
Figure 6.4 Randomly Select Q within Distance R from Point P 
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The procedure is summarized as below: 
... 
Challengerresponder: xQ,yQ and trec 
// go ahead if trec is valid, otherwise the responder terminates the connection 
Challengerresponder: xM,yM 
// go ahead if M is within the radius of R from P, otherwise the challenger stops 
… 
 
6.3 Protocol of Rain Scheme 
The rain algorithm above achieves the desired property as the required response is 
inaccurate but still contains part of the information of the password, H(pu). However, 
because the answers are not strictly right, an attacker in the middle of the transmission is 
possible to guess the point M, and by a small chance (which is determined by the 
parameters used in the implementation and we’ll explain the detail later) he may pass the 
question. To prevent such a scenario, several challenge-response rounds are executed in 
our major protocol to minimize the possibility to any small number for an attacker to pass 
the authentication without knowing the password. Following is the protocol: 
US  : execute TLS and compute ms 
US  : ms <enter user id> 
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US  : ms <U> 
US  : ms < Q0, trec0 > 
US  : ms <Q1, trec1 > 
US  : ms < Q2, trec2 > 
… 
US  : ms < Qm, trecm > 
US  : ms <pu> 
where Qi (i=1,2,…,m) is the response of the previous challenge and also serves as part of 
the current challenge and Q0 is a random point to initialize the challenges. Similarly, treci 
is the time when the challenger receives the last message.  
In the protocol, the two parties first use TLS to establish a secure channel which 
prevents eavesdrops and data modifications. After providing the username, the user is 
first challenged. The reason why not the server be challenged first is that the server is 
always available to everyone including the attacker. If the server first make a response to 
a user or an attacker (server doesn’t know the identity of the requester before finish the 
authentication procedure), the later one will get a little information of the password after 
doing the first challenge (then terminate the connection each time after). After 
performing several connections, the attacker may obtain enough information about the 
password and arranges a dictionary attack. So in order to prevent this fatal weakness, in 
the protocol, the user is first challenged by the server; even somehow a phishing website 
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can do the same to the user, information collection process is much slower and more 
difficult than that in the previous situation because users are not always available on-line 
be fooled time after time by the same trick. 
 
6.4 How to Choose the Radius 
The value of R determines the probability of the success of a randomized guessing of the 
challenge. The probability, in turn affects how many rounds is “enough” for correctly 
authenticating the both parties. In another word, taking larger value of R results in higher 
probability of successful guesses, and thus requires more rounds of challenge-response 
rounds to perform the authentication. This also introduces more computational work and 
consumes more time to process. However, taking larger value of R also increase the 
number of pieces of information which is required for attacker to manage a dictionary 
attack. Therefore, users may be allowed to make more mistakes (such as being tricked by 
various fraudulent websites) while still keep their secret safe from dictionary attacks. 
 
6.5 Other Aspects 
The protocol is aimed to reduce the possibility of which a phishing attack combined with 
off-line password guessing attack on a web application succeeds. It provides a way to 
eliminate the information leaks while performs authentication correctly. However, it 
doesn’t prevent information leaking completely. An attacker, who personates either a 
subscribed user or a web server) still has the chance to pass a challenge or even achieve a 
piece of information of secret with no pay. Other measurements must be used together to 
provide a reasonable performance. 
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In the scenario that an attacker impersonates a legal user, if the target server allows 
whatever number of false guesses, the attacker will eventually collects enough 
information to arrange a dictionary attack off-line by keeping trying guessing the 
challenges. It is necessary for the server to implement one of the many time-out schemes 
or frozen the target account after certain number of false try. It is better to notify the user 
what have happened to their accounts by other means (such as making a phone call, send 
a mail) as well. 
In another scenario, once an attacker manages a phishing attack to a subscribed user, 
the target user, without carefulness, may provides one piece of information of the user’s 
secret to the attacker. Fortunately, as long as the number of mistakes below a certain 
threshold determined by R (which we have just discussed above), the user’s secret is still 
safe to dictionary attack, and normally it’s true because people tend to learn from making 
mistakes. 
A more subtle problem is that attackers may communicate and change their gathered 
information from managing various fraudulent websites. Because people tend to use same 
or similar user names and passwords among various websites, the information gathered 
from the websites may be analyzed and combined to increase the possibility of managing 
dictionary attacks. In the worst case when a user uses the same user name and password 
among all the used websites, the total number of the pieces of the leaked information is 
the sum of that on each one. As we mentioned before, if too much information is unveiled 
to the attacker, a dictionary attack is successful, therefore users who use universal 
password is more likely to be targeted and the system will be unreliable. 
Some suggestions to web users can alleviate the problem above if being deployed:  
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1. For the popular websites owned by large commercial companies and 
institutions, use popular search engines such as Google to open the links to the 
websites. 
2. Always be suspect when being asked by unfamiliar websites to put into 
personal information such as credit card number to perform a transaction. 
3. Use the tools which are embedded into web browsers to provide clearer 
domain information or brief description of the linked website, such as TrustBar [11].  
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CHAPTER 7. IMPLEMENTATION AND PERFORMANCE 
7.1 Implementation 
We implemented the TPPCA using Visual Basic programming language which runs in 
Microsoft Windows systems or any platform run .NET framework. 
This procedure simulates how a client interacts with a corresponding server to 
authenticate each other in order to establish a secure session for the following web 
application 
In the implementation, we suppose that before opening a connection to the server, the 
server and the client have already run a TLS protocol and succeeded in verifying the 
certificate of the server. Thus in this application the client need to first store the session 
key (which is created by the server), used to encrypt the following data, then computes 
the password for the intended website using the universal password provided by the user 
and the domain name of the server. (Note that we now only provide a version in the 
application which runs the both side of the protocol on a same machine, thus the domain 
name of the server is configured as 'localhost', which indicate the destination address is 
the local machine. A modified version of the protocol can be implemented by check up 
the server domain name using domain name server once the user confirms a URL.)
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The first figure shows a Graphic User Interface (GUI) created by the server application 
and shows the status of the server. 
 
Figure 7.1 Initial GUI of TPPCA Server 
A GUI created by client program for user to enter authentication information and 
shows the status of the connection. 
 
Figure 7.2 Initial GUI of TPPCA Client 
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After receiving a request, the server validates the user’s name and sends an image 
encrypted using user’s hash code. 
 
Figure 7.3 TPPCA Server Receives a Connection 
The client decrypts the image and displays it in a picture box. In the implementation, 
we generate an arbitrary image each time which contains a welcome phrase “Hello” 
followed by the user’s name.
 
Figure 7.4 TPPCA Client Decrypts the Image using the Password and Displays It 
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By clicking Change Image button, client asks for another image and then displays it. 
 
Figure 7.5 User Asks for Another Image by Clicking the Change Image Button 
If user click Accept button, clients sends the user’s password. After validating the 
password, the server authenticates the user and sends a new session key for the following 
web application and disconnects with the client. 
 
Figure 7.6 TPPCA Server Closes the Connection after Sending a New Session Key 
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Client gets the key which can be used in the following web application, and closes the 
connection. 
 
Figure 7.7 TPPCA Client Receives the New Session Key 
 
7.2 Performance 
We now compare the performances of the TPPCA and its base protocol, TPP. The 
additional computation required by TPPCA includes three parts: 
1. To create, encode and encrypt an image on server side: 
The computer used in our implementation is a 32 bit, duo-core with 2GHz frequency 
and 2GB memory space. We create bitmaps which contains 200 * 200 pixels, and that 
takes tens of milliseconds depends on the content of the image; the encoder encodes each 
pixel using 24bits color scheme, and uses Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (Triple DES) 
for the encryption criteria, which also takes tens of milliseconds. 
2. To transmit the image data: 
The bitmap file created above is about 12KB. The transmission time on the network 
depends primarily on its bandwidth. For example, for the transmission rates are 10KB/sec, 
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100KB/sec and 1MB/sec, the time consumed on the transmission are 1.2sec, 0.12sec, and 
12millisec respectively.  
3. To decrypt and decode the image data on client side: 
Like the first part, it usually takes tens of milliseconds. 
The total time used above is comparatively small to a large transaction of web data.  
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CHAPTER 8. FUTURE WORKS 
We introduced TPP with challenge response (using arbitrary image) for establishing 
authentication sessions for any web application. The scheme can prevent Man-in-the-
middle attack, eavesdropping, phishing attack as its predecessor TPP do, as well as off-
line password guessing attack which may exist in an unsecure network. However, this 
scheme doesn’t provide any protection from off-line password guessing in user database 
if the server has been compromised. Because in such a case, the hash code of a user’s 
password is available for the attacker and thus could be user directly for a password 
guessing attack. 
Our work doesn’t provide any scheme to organize a user’s passwords efficiently. For 
example, a complete version of the scheme should provide a way to easily change all 
passwords which used by a user in different web application. One possible solution is to 
store the web application information somewhere, probably in a database on the internet. 
After signing in the database, user click a button to change all the passwords using the 
function provided by the database which automatically connects to each of the websites 
user uses, and change them using the new universal password user specified.  
Another issue related to the above is password timeout problem. As the websites 
which a user uses the universal password increases, if the password for each of them has 
a timeout feature, user will be busy to change the universal secret frequently because it is 
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required by the timeout feature whenever one of the passwords times out. As another 
future work to do, we’ll design a server-side application which allows the universal 
secrets generated password bypass the timeout check. The reason behind this is that the 
passwords generated by universal secrets are of high randomness and thus cannot be 
guessed by dictionary attacks. Therefore there is no need to add timeout feature to keep 
them secure. 
For the later scheme, we’ll experiment and adjust the parameters specified in the 
protocol to get the best performance regarding to the resources consumed (such as time 
and memory space) and security features (such as how many bad connections is allowed 
to make to a fraudulent website).
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CHAPTER 9. CONCLUSION 
In the thesis, we first introduced the technology of the World Wide Web and then showed 
how important it is in our daily lives. In the following chapters, we examined how a 
typical web authentication session sets up and the security problems may occur. Then we 
introduced the popular authentication protocols for web authentication, which include 
HTTPS, EAP-TTLS, SSL/TLS session-aware. The advantages and problems of each 
have been discussed. 
After that we introduced Two Way Password Protocol (TPP) in detail, which included 
a feature called universal password, the procedure of the protocol and how it prevents 
phishing attacks. In the next chapter, we gave out a new protocol built upon TPP, which 
not only prevent the phishing attacks but the off-line password guessing attacks as well. 
As in the detail, we illustrated how TPP with a normal challenge response scheme failed 
to protect the secrecy from off-line password guessing attacks, and then we modified it 
using an arbitrary image in the protocol instead of a normal challenge and solved the 
problem successfully. 
In the next chapter, we illustrated another scheme rain scheme, which is also a possible 
solution to the same problem.
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We showed the details of the implementation of the first protocol and briefly discussed 
the efficiency. Finally, we gave a discussion other aspects among the problem and our 
schemes and gave a discussion of the future works. 
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APPENDIX 
SSL/TLS 
The following contents in this appendix use the exactly the same from [19]. 
TLS and its predecessor SSL are cryptographic protocols that provide communication 
security over the Internet. TLS and SSL encrypt the segments of network connections 
above the Transport Layer, using asymmetric cryptography for key exchange, symmetric 
encryption for privacy, and message authentication codes for message integrity. 
 
TLS handshake in detail 
The TLS protocol exchanges records, which encapsulate the data to be exchanged. Each 
record can be compressed, padded, appended with a message authentication code (MAC), 
or encrypted, all depending on the state of the connection. Each record has a content type 
field that specifies the record, a length field and a TLS version field. 
When the connection starts, the record encapsulates another protocol – the handshake 
messaging protocol – which has content type 22. 
A simple connection example follows, illustrating a handshake where the server is 
authenticated by its certificate: 
Negotiation phase: 
A client sends a ClientHello message specifying the highest TLS protocol version it 
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supports, a random number, a list of suggested CipherSuites and suggested compression 
methods. If the client is attempting to perform a resumed handshake, it may send a 
session ID. 
The server responds with a ServerHello message, containing the chosen protocol 
version, a random number, CipherSuite and compression method from the choices 
offered by the client. To confirm of allow resumed hankshakes the server may send a 
session ID. The chosen protocol version should be the highest that both the client and 
server support. 
 
Figure A.1 SSL/TLS handshake [2] 
 
The server sends its Certificate message. 
The server sends a ServerHelloDone message, indicating it is done with handshake 
negotiation. 
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The client responds with a ClientKeyExchange message, which may contain a 
PreMasterSecret, public key, or nothing (This depends on the selected cipher.) this 
PreMasterSecret is encrypted using the public key of the serer certificate. 
The client and server then user the random numbers and PreMasterSecret to compute a 
common secret, called the “master secret”. All other key data for this connection is 
derived from this master secret (and the client- and server-generated random values), 
which is passed through a carefully designed pseudorandom function. 
The client now sends a ChangeCipherSpec record, essentially telling the server, 
“Everything I tell you from now on will be authenticated (and encrypted if encryption 
parameters were present in the server certificate).” The ChangeCipherSpec is itself a 
record-level protocol with content type of 20. 
Finally, the client sends an authenticated and encrypted Finished message, containing a 
hash and MAC over the previous handshake messages. 
The server will attempt to decrypt the client’s Finished message and verify the hash 
and MAC. If the decryption or verification fails, the handshake is considered to have 
failed and the connection should be torn down. 
Finally, the server sends a ChangeCipherSpec, telling the client, “Everything I tell you 
from now on will be authenticated (and encrypted).” 
The server sends its authenticated and encrypted Finished message. 
The client performs the same decryption and verification. 
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Application phase: at this point, the “handshake” is complete and application protocol 
is enabled, with content type of 23. Application messages exchanged between client and 
server will also be authenticated and optionally encrypted exactly like in their Finished 
message. Otherwise, the content type will return 25 and the client will not authenticate. 
 
TLS Applications 
In applications design, TLS is usually implemented on top of any of the Transport Layer 
protocols, encapsulating the application-specific protocols such as HTTP, File Transfer 
Protocol (FTP), Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP), Network News Transfer Protocol 
(NNTP) and Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP). Historically it has 
been used primarily with reliable transport protocols such as the TCP. However, it has 
also been implemented with datagram-oriented transport protocols, such as the User 
Datagram Protocol (UDP) and the Datagram Congestion Control Protocol (DCCP), usage 
which has been standardized independently using the term Datagram Transport Layer 
Security (DTLS). 
A prominent use of TLS is for securing World Wide Web traffic carried by HTTP to 
form HTTPS. Notable applications are electronic commerce and asset management. 
Increasingly, the SMTP is also protected by TLS. These applications use public key 
certificates to verify the identity of endpoints. 
